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INTRODUCTION
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

On August 9, 2018, an officer was conducting undercover surveillance in an
unmarked black BMW when he was approached by the Defendant Jesse Paschane
(hereinafter “Paschane”) and his friend James Popp (hereinafter “Popp”). 483222020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 1331. Paschane and Popp confronted the
undercover officer at the door of his unmarked vehicle and demanded to know why
he drove by their house. Id. Upon opening his vehicle door to speak with them,
Paschane drew a pistol from his waistband and briefly pointed it towards the
officer’s leg. Id. After seeing his “marked” vest and drawn duty pistol, Paschane
dropped the gun and immediately laid down onto the ground. Id.
On questioning at the scene, Paschane stated that several other vehicles had
been driving slowly past his home. 48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 3.
Paschane told the officer that he had enemies and wanted to find out who was

1

On December 31, 2019, a Notice of Appeal was filed for case no. CR28-1812844/47697-2020. On September 21, 2020, a Notice of Appeal and a Notice to
Consolidate all four cases was filed in CR28-18-13606/48322-2020, CR28-18-199718/48323-2020, and CR28-19-16233/48324-2020. The Defense received
separate Clerk’s Records for each of the aforementioned cases and denotes where
each citation can be located in the record it pertains to by referencing the Idaho
Supreme Court case no. beforehand.
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driving by his house. Id. He stated he couldn't see through the vehicle windows
and didn't know who was driving these vehicles. Id. Paschane told the officer that
he didn’t know that he was a police officer until he could see his police vest and
service pistol. Id. Paschane was arrested and charged with felony Aggravated
Assault Idaho Code § 18-901, 18-905. 47697-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 11.
A week later, on August 16, 2018, Shiaynn Hobbs-Schulke reported that her
boyfriend, Paschane, grabbed her by both of her arms, pinned her against the wall,
then strangled her for approximately one minute. 48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol.
I, p. 3. She also indicated that Paschane had held a gun to her head. Id. A search
warrant was obtained to locate the gun at Paschane’s home. Id.
On August 17, 2018, the search warrant was executed and numerous
firearms were located in Paschane’s home with magazines containing ammunition.
48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 3. A safe was also located, but officers
could only slightly open a corner of the safe at the home. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p.
73. Because they did not have the proper tools to cut open the safe, law
enforcement transported it to a nearby police station where they were able to cut it
open. Id. After successfully opening the safe, officers found a box of ammunition
and approximately 28 grams of cocaine. 48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 3.
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Paschane was subsequently charged with four felonies Case Nos. CR28-1812844 Aggravated Assault, CR28-19-9718 Attempted Strangulation, CR28-1813606 Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver of a Controlled Substance,
and CR28-19-16233 Possession with the Intent to Manufacture or Deliver. 476972020 R. Vol. I, p. 11-12, 48323-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 9-10, 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p.
13-14, 48324-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 9-10.
On February 12, 2019, a plea agreement was reached under Rule 11(f) and
the parties submitted that pretrial settlement offer to the District Court. At the plea
change hearing, the Court accepted Paschane’s guilty pleas but reserved being
bound to the Rule 11(f) joint recommendations pending her full review of a
presentence report. 47697-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 47. After the presentence report was
submitted, the Court rejected the parties agreement feeling the 90 day sentence to
be to lenient. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 61-62. After rejecting the plea agreement,
and without discussing Paschane’s various options under Rule 11(f)(4), the District
Court reinstated Paschane’s not guilty pleas and set the matter for trial. Id. At
trial and after the State and the Defense presented their evidence, the Defense
requested a self-defense instruction. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 468. The District
Court rejected the proposed instruction and the jury convicted Paschane of felony
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Aggravated Assault and sentenced him to two (2) years in prison. Id., 47697-2020
Tr. Vol. I, p. 499 and 47697-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 178-180.
Paschane would later enter an Alford plea to the other three felonies and
those sentences were ordered to run concurrent with the aggravated assault
conviction. 48323-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 86-90, 130-131, 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, 182183, and 48324-2020 R. Vol. I, 121-122.
At sentencing, Paschane was ordered to serve two (2) years in prison and an
additional eight (8) years of probation to follow.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Originally, Paschane was charged with Aggravated Assault on August 9,
2018, CR28-18-12844. 47697-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 3. Following the
execution of a search warrant, Paschane was also charged with Attempted
Strangulation, CR28-19-9718, two counts of Delivery of Cocaine, and Possession
of Cocain with the Intent to Deliver, CR28-18-13606 and CR28-19-16233. 476972020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 3. and 48324-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 15.
On November 15, 2018, a motion to suppress was filed by the Defense.
48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 71-75. Paschane’s counsel argued that when law
enforcement removed Paschane’s safe from his residence and transported it to the
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police station, they failed to get an additional warrant before they fully cut it open
at the station. Id. The motion cited State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80 (1985), and
requested that because law enforcement removed the safe and cut it open off site,
all the contents of the safe should be suppressed. Id.
The State argued that because one of the officer’s believed he could see an
ammunition box while he was trying to pry open the safe at the residence, law
enforcement should be permitted to transport the safe to the police station to cut it
open and then search and seize its contents. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 76-80. A
hearing on the motion to suppress was held and the officer testified that when they
were trying to pry open the safe at the residence that he could see a small
cardboard box that “looked like an ammunition box.” 48322-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p.
46, L. 13. After which, the safe was transported to the police station and cut open.
48322-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 47-48.
After some additional briefing, the District Court denied the motion to
suppress. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 84-92. The District Court reasoned that
because the safe looked like a “gun safe” and that law enforcement could see what
“appeared” to be an ammunition box before transporting it to the police station, it
was lawful to cut it open off site. Id.
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In the Court’s memorandum outlining her decision, the Court explains that
law enforcement did not need a second warrant before they cut it open at the police
station because they “had probable cause to search the gun safe for firearms and
ammunition under the original search warrant...” 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 89. Put
another way, because “[t]he search warrant at issue here was for firearms and
ammunition and a gun safe would fall within the scope of the search because it was
a container that may have firearms or ammunition inside it... the evidence obtained
as a result of the search of the gun safe does not warrant suppression...” 483222020 R. Vol. I, p. 91.
On February 12, 2019, Paschane signed a Rule 11(f) plea agreement and
submitted the pretrial settlement offer to the district court. 47697-2020 R. Vol. I,
p. 47. The agreement was that if Paschane plead guilty to the original aggravated
assault, the state would agree to a total 5 year prison sentence, that the 5 years all
would be suspended, 3 years of supervised probation, 90 days total of local jail and
to dismiss the attempted strangulation and cocaine charges. Id.
On February 12, 2019, the District Court held a hearing to review the Rule
11(f) agreement with Paschane, his counsel, and the prosecutor. 47697-2020 Tr.
Vol. I, p. 28-31. After reviewing the agreement and the police reports, the Court
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preformed a full colloquy with Paschane to ensure that he was knowingly and
voluntarily entering his guilty pleas and fully understood the plea agreement. Id.
After being made satisfied that Paschane did sign the agreement knowingly and
voluntarily, the Court accepted his guilty pleas, ordered a presentence investigation
report and set a date for sentencing. Id.
A presentence report was filed on April 22, 2019, and contained a lengthy
statement from the officer. 47697-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 3-5. In his
statement, the officer did not agree with the disposition and opined that Paschane
should be punished more severely for pointing a firearm at the undercover officer’s
leg. Id.
On May 2, 2019, at the sentencing hearing, the District Court voiced her
concern and was “uncomfortable with following the Rule 11.” 47697-2020 Tr.
Vol. I, p. 31-63. The Court then inquired about how the parties felt about rejecting
the agreement and setting the matter for trial. Id. Defense counsel, objected and
requested that they proceed to sentencing. Id. Counsel outlined his frustration as
such:
And, I don’t know, obviously, it’s the Court's prerogative to deny that,
and I don't know some of the Court's feelings behind that. There was a letter
submitted by the officer, who was kind of a victim, who I think included
some inappropriate comments and stuff in there about some other opinions
-7-

about my client. And I have some concerns that the Court might have taken
that into consideration in denial of the Rule 11.
47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 54, L 10-18.
In contrast, and although the state prosecutor had already agreed and signed
the Rule 11(f) agreement, his reasoning was that if the Court has any “reluctance,”
the Court should reject it, and set the case for trial. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 5263. The prosecutor also outlined that since he did not discuss the proposed
resolution with law enforcement before signing the agreement, it should also be
revoked for that reason. Id. After hearing from both Defense and the State, the
Court rejected the Rule 11(f) agreement because after reviewing “the PSI and
everything else that I’ve read... I’m just not comfortable with being bound to a
probationary sentence...” Id.
Before objecting the agreement and sua sponte setting the matter for trial,
the District Court did not advise Paschane of his Rule 11(f)(4) choices. Put
simply, the Defendant was never given the choice to: (1) stand by his plea and face
a disposition that may be less favorable to him than that contemplated by the
agreement; (2) withdraw his plea and attempt to renegotiate a new plea agreement
without an agreed upon specific sentence; or (3) withdraw his plea and take his
chances at trial.
-8-

Trial was conducted from September 5-6, 2019. 47697-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 7.
At the conclusion, the Defense proposed a self-defense and a lack of duty to retreat
instruction. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 465-476. The Defense argued that under a
reasonable view of the evidence the Defendant’s legal theory that he only pulled
his pistol in self-defense did support the instruction. Id.
The Defense proposed the following instruction:
Aggravated Assault is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense.
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the following
conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the assault:
(1) the defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent
danger of great bodily harm; (2) in addition to that belief, the defendant must
have believed that the action the defendant took was necessary to save the
defendant from the danger presented; (3) the circumstances must have been
such that a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would have
believed that the defendant was in imminent danger of great bodily injury
and believed that the action taken was necessary; (4) the defendant must
have acted only in response to that danger and not for some other
motivation; and (5) when there is no longer any reasonable appearance of
danger, the right of self-defense ends.
47697-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 101-105.
From the trial record, the following evidence was presented to the jury: (1)
the confrontation occurred at night; (2) there was a history of drive-bys at the
residence; (3) the undercover officer was in an unmarked black BMW; (4) during
the confrontation, the undercover officer testified that both Paschane and Popp
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were “yelling” and “upset;” (5) that it was a very “tense situation;” (6) that the
officer felt “he had to get out of his vehicle;” (7) that he felt “trapped;” (8) that
when the officer did open the BMW’s door, Paschane had his back turned; and (9)
Paschane’s friend Popp raised up his hands. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 208-217,
303, 393.
After hearing from both the Defense and the State, the District Court denied
the instruction, concluding that a self-defense theory did not comport with a
“reasonable view” of the evidence. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 474-476. After
almost three (3) hours in deliberation, the jury convicted Paschane for felony
aggravated assault. 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 499.
On November 14, 2019, the District Court sentenced Paschane to two (2)
fixed years in prison and followed by an additional indeterminate period of eight
(8) years of probation. 47697-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 178-180.
On the remaining felonies, Paschane filed an Alford Plea and was sentenced
to a unified sentence not the exceed twelve (12) years, commencing with a fixed
period of four (4) years to be followed by an additional indeterminate period of
eight (8) years all to run concurrent with the aggravated assault. 48322-2020 R.
Vol. I, p. 182-183.
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 9, 2018, a Kootenai County undercover officer was conducting
surveillance on a house in Coeur d’Alene in an unmarked black BMW. 483222020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 4-6. The undercover officer parked his vehicle
outside the home and turned off his lights. Id. A SUV with its lights on was
parked backwards in the driveway of the home and had its lights on. Id.
The SUV drove onto the street, then parked in the middle of the street next
to the undercover officer’s BMW. 48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 4-6. As
the Paschane and his friend Popp exited the SUV and approached the BMW, the
undercover officer partially opened his driver’s side window. Id. Paschane and
Popp confronted the undercover officer at the door of his unmarked vehicle and
demanded to know why he drove by Paschane’s house. Id.
Upon opening his vehicle door to speak with them, Paschane started to draw
a pistol from his waistband and briefly pointed it towards the officer’s leg.
48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 4-6. The officer drew his service weapon
and prepared for a gunfight with Paschane at a range of 5 feet. Id. But after seeing
the officer’s vest which had a black and gray Coeur d’Alene Police badge of the
left chest and a reflective “Police” label of the right chest, Paschane immediately
dropped the pistol and laid down on the ground. Id.
-11-

Upon questioning at the scene, Paschane stated the officer’s unmarked
BMW as well as other cars have driven slowly past his house recently. 483222020 Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 4-6. He told the officer he had enemies and wanted
to find out who was driving by his house. Id. Paschane stated he couldn't see
through the vehicle windows and didn't know who was driving these vehicles,
including the BMW. Id. Paschane was arrested and charged with Aggravated
Assault. Id.
A week later, Paschane’s girlfriend Shiaynn Hobbs-Schulke, accused
Paschane of grabbing her by both arms, pinning her against the wall, then
strangling her for approximately one minute. 48322-2020 Confidential R. Vol. I,
p. 4. On August 17, 2018, Detective Taylor obtained a warrant to search
Defendant’s home for “[f]irearms, ammunition, and any evidence to establish
ownership (for example: utility bills/statements, registrations, driver’s licenses,
mail, receipts, insurance documents, etc.) of property” in connection with an
aggravated assault investigation. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 76.
The search warrant provided “[i]f the above described property, or any part
thereof, is found, then seize said property and leave a copy of this warrant.”
48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 84-91. Later on that day, Detective Taylor executed the
search warrant at Defendant’s address in Coeur d’Alene. Id. During the search,
-12-

Detective Taylor recovered multiple guns, including one gun underneath the couch,
a shotgun by the refrigerator, and a third gun inside the master bedroom. Id.
A locked Pro Vault safe was found inside the closet of the master bedroom.
The safe was approximately 4.5 to 5 feet tall and appeared to the Detective to be a
“rifle-type safe” based on its height. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 85. Detective
Taylor attempted to open the safe at Defendant’s residence with pry bars and
hammers, and could only open a corner. Id. While prying the safe open at the
residence, the Detective saw what he “believed” to be an “ammunition box” inside
the safe. Id. After trying with the pry bars and hammer, Detective Taylor
determined that he lacked the tools required to fully open the safe on-site. Id.
The Detective sent another officer to the jail to obtain the combination for
the safe from Defendant, but Defendant was in court. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 85.
Detective Taylor took the safe out of Paschane’s residence and transported it back
to the police department in order to open it. Id. At the police department, officers
used a cutting wheel and a pry bar to open the safe. Id. Once the safe was fully
open, officers found a box of ammunition, a white powder substance, jewelry and
other personal effects inside of the safe. Id. Detective Taylor did not obtain a
second search warrant prior to opening the safe off-site at the police department.
Id.
-13-

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REJECTING THE
DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT
NEVER WITHDREW HIS PLEA AND DID PERSIST TO
DISPOSITION.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING
EVIDENCE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED FROM THE
DEFENDANT’S LOCKED SAFE.

C.

AT TRIAL, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTION OF SELF-DEFENSE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where a trial court’s decision turns on the interpretation of a criminal rule,
the Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175
(2008) and State v. Wever, 140 Idaho, 89, 91-92 (2004) (reviewing the trial court’s
interpretation of I.C.R. 11).
When this Court reviews a district court's grant or denial of a motion to
suppress evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated: the Court accepts the trial
court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the application
of constitutional law to the facts. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d
659, 662 (2017).
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over
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which the Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. Garner, 159 Idaho 896
(Ct.App. 2016). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions
as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State
v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, (Ct.App.1993).
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////
/////

-15-

ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REJECTING THE
DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT
NEVER WITHDREW HIS PLEA AND DID PERSIST TO
DISPOSITION.

When the District Court rejected the Rule 11(f) plea agreement, having
previously accepted Paschane’s guilty plea, a number of options became available.
The option the District Court chose - forcing Paschance to go to trial - was not one
of them.
Put another way, when Paschane’s Rule 11(f) plea agreement was rejected, it
was Paschane’s choice whether to: (1) stand by his plea and face a disposition that
may be less favorable to him than that contemplated by the agreement; (2)
withdraw his plea and attempt to renegotiate a new plea agreement without an
agreed upon specific sentence; or (3) withdraw his plea and take his chances at
trial. See generally, In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (giving a
very detailed and expansive outline on why withdrawing a defendant’s plea of
guilty is the defendant’s choice, not the courts). Nowhere does Rule 11 provide
that the District Court may dictate this choice.
Rule 11(f)(4) provides the following:
(4)

Rejection of the Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea
agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this
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fact, advise the defendant personally in open court, or, on a showing
of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the plea
agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the
defendant’s plea, and advise the defendant that if the defendant
persists in the guilty plea the disposition of the case may be less
favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
Rule 11(f)(4).
In Mr. Paschane’s case, it is clear from the record, that the Court failed to
inform the Defendant of his choices. Instead, the Court, on her own, made
Paschane’s decision to withdraw his pleas of guilty and proceed to trial.
On May 2, 2019, the District Court held a hearing to inform the Defendant
that she would be rejecting the parties’ plea agreement. At no point during this
hearing did the Court advise the Defendant personally of his three choices: (1)
withdraw the previously entered guilty plea and negotiate a new plea agreement;
(2) withdraw the previously entered guilty plea and proceed to trial; or (3) persist
and potentially face a less favorable disposition than the one contemplated within
the plea agreement.
THE COURT: Good morning. This is District Court, and I'm Judge
Meyer. We have several matters on the calendar this morning, and I
thought that we would start with the Paschane cases.
This is State versus Jesse Paschane. We're here in three cases, CR28l8-12844, CR28-18-13606, and CR28-18-19234. Mr. Paschane is
present in court. He is out of custody. He's represented by Mr. Redal,
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and the State is represented by Mr. Verharen.
We were scheduled for sentencing last week, or perhaps the week
before, and I indicated that I was uncomfortable with following the
Rule ll. Mr. Verharen wasn't available at that particular hearing, and
so I wanted to set it out for perhaps further discussion, and so we set
the sentencing out.
In the meantime, I see that the State has filed a motion to set the two
felony matters for trial.
Any comments from counsel?
Mr. Verharen?
MR. VERHAREN: That would be my preference, Judge.
THE COURT: Just go ahead and set it?
MR. VERHAREN: Please.
THE COURT: Mr. Redal?
MR. REDAL: Well, we'd object to that, Judge. I think the basis for
the motion was that the Court has denied the Rule ll agreement. I
don't know that the Court actually has done that. We actually set that
matter out to have further discussions as to the basis for that.
And, I don't know, obviously, it's the Court's prerogative to deny that,
and I don't know some of the Court's feelings behind that. There was
a letter submitted by the officer, who was kind of a victim, who I
think included some inappropriate comments and stuff in there about
some other opinions about my client. And I have some concerns that
the Court might have taken that into consideration in denial of the
Rule ll.
And I still don't think the Court has denied the Rule ll at this point. I
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think we're going to have further discussions. I don't think it's
necessarily appropriate when the Court still hasn't denied it for the
Court to file a motion to set the matter for trial when the Court hasn't
heard any additional argument as to why the parties came to the
agreement they did.
47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 53-55.
After discussing the presentence report and the officer’s letter, the Court
asked the lawyers why the District Court should accept the terms of the plea
agreement. At this point, the State explained that he failed to discuss the
agreement with the officer and urged the court to reject the plea agreement. 476972020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 53-63. In opposite, Paschane’s attorney explained why a 90 day
local jail sentence with 5 years suspended was appropriate and requested to
proceed to sentencing. Id. The Court then concluded as follows, without advising
Paschane of his three options under Rule 11(f)(4).
THE COURT: Well, thank you. I think what you both said is helpful,
but it doesn't change my initial thoughts with respect to this agreement
under the circumstances of these cases and, you know, the PSI and
everything else that I've read.
I'm not going to go along with this particular Rule ll, and primarily
because I'm not going to be bound by a probationary sentence right off
the bat. That's not something that I'm at all comfortable with.
The conduct that was pled guilty to, not considering the other conduct
that was dismissed that isn't even in front of me, but only considering
these two cases, it's really serious conduct, and I'm just not
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comfortable with being bound to a probationary sentence at this point
in time.
I realize that I can enter a substantial underlying sentence, but ——
and I understand that the Probation Department can keep an eye on
the defendant and we can deal with any potential probation violations,
or no probation violations, depending on what might happen. But this
is not an agreement that I'm going to go along with.
So with that, Mr. Paschane, I'm going to give you back your guilty
plea, and I will enter not guilty pleas for you to the cases. We'll go
ahead and set out the two felony cases for trial.
47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 61-62.
As the 9th Circuit wrote en banc, the acceptance of a criminal defendant’s
guilty plea is a judicial act distinct from the acceptance of the plea agreement itself.
In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Once the District Court
accepts a guilty plea, the conditions under which the plea may be withdrawn are
governed exclusively by Rule 11.
As illustrated above, the District Court failed to follow Rule 11(f)(4)
mandate to allow the Defendant to choose his own path. The rule specifies that
whether or not to withdraw his previously entered guilty plea is his choice, not the
Court’s decision. It is therefore requested that this Court vacate the Defendant’s
convictions and remand the matter back to the District Court to conduct a new Rule
11(f)(4) hearing.
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING
EVIDENCE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED FROM THE
DEFENDANT’S LOCKED SAFE.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the
Fourth Amendment, except that “oath or affirmation” is termed “affidavit.” In
order for a search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to
believe that evidence or fruits of a crime may be found in a particular place. State
v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792–93 (1993); State v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277, 280
(Ct.App.2009).
A magistrate need only determine that it would be reasonable to seek the
evidence in the place indicated in the warrant, not that the evidence sought is there
in fact, or is more likely than not to be found, where the search takes place. State
v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287 (Ct.App.2006); State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960,
966 (Ct.App.1992).
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the privacy of citizens by insuring
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against the search of premises where probable cause is lacking. O'Keefe, 143
Idaho at 285; State v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 714, (Ct.App.2002). Accordingly, a
search warrant must describe the place to be searched with particularity. State v.
Schaffer, 112 Idaho 1024, 1027,(1987); O'Keefe, 143 Idaho at 285. The purpose of
the particularity requirement is to minimize the risk that officers executing search
warrants will mistakenly search a place other than the one intended by the
magistrate. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho at 285. Thus, the description must be sufficiently
clear so that the property to be searched is recognizable from other neighboring
properties. Id.; Young, 136 Idaho at 715. The test for determining the sufficiency
of the description of the place to be searched is whether the place is described with
sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the
premises with reasonable effort and whether there is any reasonable probability
that another premise might be mistakenly searched. Young, 136 Idaho at 715.
The requirements of probable cause and particularity serve different
purposes.
[There are] two distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant
requirement. First, the magistrate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate
altogether searches not based on probable cause.... The second, distinct
objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as
possible. Here, the specific evil is the “general warrant” abhorred by the
colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,
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exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.... The warrant
accomplishes this second objective by requiring a particular description of
the things to be seized.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
The application of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause turns, as it must,
on what law enforcement officers actually do, not upon what they might have
done. More fundamentally, the Fourth Amendment does not countenance the
seizure of a container, such as a home safe, which is outside the scope of any
warrant and which bears no outwardly apparent connection with any crime, simply
for the purpose of searching it later.
The Supreme Court has specifically noted the constitutional limitation upon
seizing containers such as a home safe:
Although in the context of personal property, and particularly containers, the
fourth amendment challenge is typically to the subsequent search of the
container rather than to its initial seizure by the authorities, our cases reveal
some general principles regarding seizures. In the ordinary case, the Court
has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a
judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the
items to be seized.... Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause
to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have
not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the amendment to permit
seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its
contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present ....
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United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700 (1983).
In this case, on August 17, 2018, Detective Taylor obtained a warrant to
search Defendant’s home for “Firearms, ammunition, and any evidence to establish
ownership (for example: utility bills/statements, registrations, driver’s licenses,
mail, receipts, insurance documents, etc.) of property” in connection with an
aggravated assault investigation. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 85. No mention of a
safe or containers were made.
The search warrant provided “[i]f the above described property, or any part
thereof, is found, then seize said property and leave a copy of this warrant.” Id.
Later on that day, Detective Taylor executed the search warrant at the Defendant’s
address in Coeur d’Alene. Id. During the search, Detective Taylor recovered
multiple guns, including one gun underneath the couch, a shotgun by the
refrigerator, and a third gun inside the master bedroom. Id.
A locked Pro Vault safe was found inside the closet of the master bedroom.
48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 85. It was a large safe and measured approximately 4.5 to
5 feet tall. Id. Detective Taylor attempted to open the safe at the Defendant’s
residence with pry bars and with hammers. Id. The Detective was able to slightly
pry open a corner. Id. Detective Taylor later testified that while he was trying to
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pry the safe open he saw what he “believed” to be an “ammunition box” inside.
Id.
After determining that he lacked the tools required to open the safe on-site,
the Detective sent another individual to the jail to obtain the combination for the
safe from Defendant, but Defendant was in court. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 85.
Detective Taylor then transported the large safe from Paschane’s house to a nearby
police department station. Id. At the police department, officers used a cutting
wheel and a pry bar to open the safe. Id. Detective Taylor found a box of
ammunition, a white powder substance, jewelry and other personal effects inside of
the safe. Id. Detective Taylor did not obtain a second search warrant prior to
opening the safe off-site at the police department. Id.
A motion to suppress was filed by the Defense. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 7175. The Defense argued that when law enforcement removed Paschane’s safe from
his residence and transported it to the police station, they failed to secure an
additional warrant before they pried it open at the station. Id. The State argued
that because one of the officer’s believed he could see an ammunition box while he
was prying open the safe at the residence, law enforcement should be permitted to
transport the safe to the police station to cut it open. 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 76-
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80.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer testified that when they
were trying to pry open the safe at the residence, he “believed” that he could see a
small cardboard box that “looked like an ammunition box.” 47697-2020 Tr. Vol. I,
p. 46-48. After, the safe was transported to the police station and cut open without
securing a second warrant. Id.
In denying the motion to suppress, the District Court reasoned that because
the large safe looked like a “gun safe” and that law enforcement could see what
“appeared” to be an ammunition box before transporting it to the police station, it
was lawful to cut it open off site without securing a second warrant. 48322-2020
R. Vol. I, p. 91.
In the Court’s memorandum outlining her decision, the District Court
explained that law enforcement did not need a second warrant before they cut it
open at the police station because they “had probable cause to search the gun safe
for firearms and ammunition under the original search warrant...” 48322-2020 R.
Vol. I, p. 84-91. To clarify, because “[t]he search warrant at issue here was for
firearms and ammunition and a gun safe would fall within the scope of the search
because it was a container that may have firearms or ammunition inside it... the
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evidence obtained as a result of the search of the gun safe does not warrant
suppression...” Id.
Probable cause was established to search and seize the following:
“[f]irearms, ammunition, and any evidence to establish ownership (for example:
utility bills/statements, registrations, driver’s licenses, mail, receipts, insurance
documents, etc.) of property.” 48322-2020 R. Vol. I, p. 76. The search warrant
lacked probable cause and was not to be used as an overall authorization for
permission to rummage through and pry into any locked containers. The search
warrant did not authorize the searching of or the seizure of locked containers that
could “potentially” contain firearms or ammunition. If so, this search warrant
would have no end - i.e. any locked container could be pried open or cut open if it
could potentially contain a single bullet.
It’s anticipated that the State will argue two things in an attempt to justify
the safe’s warrantless search: first, the officer’s opinion that the safe looked like a
“gun safe” provided reason enough to pry it open; and second, that because the
officer pried open the safe at the residence and could see what he thought was an
ammunition box, that this provided additional probable cause which justified the
safe’s seizure and transportation to the police station. First, any safe or locked
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container could be a “gun safe” or “gun container.” There was not any probable
cause listed in the original affidavit that would support this leap of justification.
For example, if the affidavit listed that there was probable cause to believe that the
Defendant’s safe contained firearms, and then the search warrant listed the
Defendant’s safe as evidence to be searched and seized, there would be no quarrel
with law enforcement’s actions. But there is not. 48322-2020 Exhibits R. Vol. I,
p. 1-6.
Next, as soon as law enforcement pried open the safe at the residence and
saw what they believed to be an ammunition box, the unlawful search was already
underway. The District Court’s reliance on such actions was in violation of
Paschane’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from such searches and seizures.
The Idaho Supreme Court has best described this as a “general warrant” which
gave rise to the Fourth Amendment in the first place. It is therefore requested that
Court reverse the District Court’s order and remand this case back with instruction.

C.

AT TRIAL, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTION OF SELF-DEFENSE.

In instructing jurors, “the court must state to them all matters of law
necessary for their information.” State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328 (Ct.App,
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1999) (citing I.C. § 19–2132). A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed
on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, State v.
Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 758, 838 P.2d 885, 887 (Ct.App.1992); State v. Evans, 119
Idaho 383, 807 P.2d 62 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669, 726
P.2d 772, 781 (Ct.App.1986); State v. Pennell, 108 Idaho 669, 701 P.2d 289
(Ct.App.1985), including, of course, the law of self-defense. State v. Allen, 113
Idaho 676, 679, 747 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct.App.1987); State v. Spurr, 114 Idaho, 277,
279, 755 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Ct.App.1988). The right to defend oneself from attack
is embodied in several Idaho statutes.
Idaho Code §19–201 provides that “lawful resistance to the commission of a
public offense may be made: (1) By the party about to be injured;”and §19–202
specifies that “[r]esistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the
party about to be injured: (1) to prevent an offense against his person....” Section
19–202A further provides that “[n]o person in this state shall be placed in legal
jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting himself ... by reasonable means
necessary ...” These statutes do not require that the defendant believe himself to be
in danger of great bodily injury in order to assert self-defense as justification.
The Idaho Supreme Court considered whether fear of great bodily injury is
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necessary in State v. Woodward, 58 Idaho 385, 74 P.2d 92 (1937). At issue, there
was the propriety of a self-defense instruction given in a trial for assault with a
deadly weapon. The trial court had instructed the jury that self-defense would
justify the assault only if the defendant's act was “necessary to prevent the
infliction upon him of great bodily injury.” The Supreme Court held that, although
the instruction would be correct if the defendant were being tried for a homicide, it
was erroneous in a prosecution for aggravated assault. The Court stated, “[a]
person who is assaulted or interfered with by another without provocation may use
sufficient force to repel the attack without being guilty of assault even though he
may not believe himself to be in danger of grievous bodily harm.” Id. at 392, 74
P.2d at 95 (quoting People v. Lopez, 238 App.Div. 619, 265 N.Y.S. 211, 213
(1933)).
The Court explained that the quantum of force that may be used in
self-defense is dependent upon the nature of the attack upon the defendant:
The rule is elementary that one unlawfully assailed may, in self-protection,
repel force with force. The extent to which he may go is to be measured by
the character of the assault; but the right, as we have stated it, exists under
any and all circumstances.
....
No man has a right to lay hostile, threatening hands on another, except when
he is armed with legal authority to do so; and the man who does so acts at
the risk of being met with sufficient superior force and violence to overcome
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such assault.
....
The law does not require anyone to submit meekly to indignities or violence
to his person,—he may lawfully repel them or it with as much of such
character of necessary resistance as is at the time available to him.
Id. at 393–95, 74 P.2d at 96–97 (quoting State v. Goering, 106 Iowa 636, 77 N.W.
327 (1898)).
Accordingly, it is not necessary that there be evidence that the Defendant
reasonably feared great bodily harm in order to warrant a self-defense instruction.
Rather, evidence of reasonable fear of some level of bodily harm will suffice.
Hansen, 133 Idaho at 329.
Under a four-part test, a requested instruction must be given where: (1) it
properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of the evidence would
support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is not addressed adequately by other jury
instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the
evidence. State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476–77, 886 P.2d 780, 781–82
(Ct.App.1994); see also State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 385, 807 P.2d 62, 64
(Ct.App.1991). To meet the second requirement of this test, the defendant must
present at least some evidence supporting his or her theory, and any support will
suffice as long as his or her theory comports with a reasonable view of the
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evidence. Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476–77, 886 P.2d at 781–82; State v. Kodesh, 122
Idaho 756, 758, 838 P.2d 885, 887 (Ct.App.1992).
In our case, the jury heard the following evidence in support that Paschane
did have some “reasonable fear of some level of bodily harm.” From the trial
record, the following evidence was presented to the jury. First, the confrontation
occurred at night or at “dusk.” Second, there was a history of drive-byes at the
residence, with cars driving by “multiple times.” Third, the officer was in an
unmarked, undercover BMW that was “used for surveillance.” Fourth, during the
confrontation, the undercover officer testified that both Paschane and Popp were
“yelling” and “upset.” Fifth, that it was a very “tense situation.” Sixth, the officer
felt “he had to get out of his vehicle.” Seventh, that the officer felt “trapped.”
Eighth, when the officer did open the BMW’s door, Paschane had his back turned,
and “threw [his] hands up in the air.” And ninth, Popp raised up his hands. 476972020 Tr. Vol. I, p. 232-233, 207-209, 214-217, 350-351, 377 and 393-394.
Our rule is that the defendant must present at least “some” evidence
supporting his or her theory of self-defense, and any support will suffice as long as
his or her theory comports with a reasonable view of the evidence. So the question
becomes, was it reasonable that Paschane briefly drew his firearm from the front of
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his pants and pointed it at the undercover officer’s leg?
The reasonable view of the evidence was that this occurred at night, that
there was a history of “drive-bys,” that an unknown black BMW was parked across
Paschane’s house with its running lights off and the engine running, that there was
yelling and Paschane was “upset,” that the situation was “intense,” that when the
door opened, Paschane’s back was turned, and that his friend, Pop, put his hands
up in the air.
Section 19–202A provides that “[n]o person in this state shall be placed in
legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting himself ... by reasonable
means necessary ...” The evidence did provide that Paschane’s actions were
reasonable and the instruction should have been given to the jury. Because it was
not, the Court committed reversible error and it is therefore requested that this
Court reverse Paschance’s conviction and remand the matter back for a second
trial.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred on three separate occasions. First, when the District
Court rejected the Defendant’s original Rule 11, it erred because the Defendant
never formally withdrew his guilty plea and then the Court determined that the
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case should proceed by going to trial without ever consulting the Defendant. Next,
the District Court also erred when it did not suppress the evidence obtained after an
illegal search and seizure because the evidence was only obtained after an officer
proceeded to open it without seeking a second search warrant from the Court.
Further, the District Court erred when it rejected the Defense’s self-defense jury
instructions which was supported by the evidence. For all the above mentioned
reasons, it is requested that this Court reverse and remand this case for a Rule
11(f)(4) hearing, reverse the District Court’s order denying the motion to suppress,
and reverse the District Court’s denial of the Defense’s proposed self-defense
instruction.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2021.
VIETH LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
/s/ Nicolas V. Vieth
NICOLAS V. VIETH
Attorney for Jesse A. Paschane.
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